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According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and nothing more, thus neither can there be an object without properties nor can one even ''conceive'' of such an object. For example, bundle theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells, its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no '' Substance '' in which the properties '' Inhere ''. ARGUMENTS FOR THE BUNDLE THEORY The difficulty in conceiving of or describing an object without also conceiving of or describing its properties is a common justification for bundle theory, especially among current philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. The inability to comprehend any aspect of the thing other than its properties implies, this argument maintains, that one cannot conceive of a ''bare particular'' (a ''substance'' without properties), an implication that directly opposes Substance Theory . The conceptual difficulty of ''bare particulars'' was illustrated by John Locke when he described a ''substance'' by itself, apart from its properties, as "something, I know not what." Whether a '' Relation '' of an object is one of its properties may complicate such an argument. However, the argument concludes that the conceptual challenge of ''bare particulars'' leaves a bundle of properties and nothing more as the only possible conception of an object, thus justifying bundle theory. OBJECTIONS TO THE BUNDLE THEORY Objections to bundle theory concern the nature of the ''bundle of properties'', the properties' '''' relation (the ''togetherness'' relation between those constituent properties), and the impact of language on understanding reality. ''Compresence'' objection Bundle theory maintains that properties are ''bundled'' together in a collection without describing how are they tied together. For example, bundle theory regards an apple as red, four inches (100 mm) wide, and juicy but lacking an underlying ''substance''. The apple is said to be a ''bundle of properties'' including redness, being four inches (100 mm) wide, and juiciness. Critics question how bundle theory accounts for the properties' '''' (the ''togetherness'' relation between those properties) without an underlying ''substance''. Critics also question how any two given properties are determined to be properties of the same object if there is no ''substance'' in which they both ''inhere''. Traditional bundle theory explains the ''compresence'' of properties by defining an object as a collection of properties ''bound'' together. Thus, different combinations of properties and relations produce different objects. Redness and juiciness, for example, may be found together on top of the table because they are part of a bundle of properties located on the table, one of which is the "looks like an apple" property. By contrast, Substance Theory explains the ''compresence'' of properties by asserting that the properties are found together because it is the ''substance'' that has those properties. In substance theory, a ''substance'' is the thing in which properties ''inhere''. For example, redness and juiciness are found on top of the table because redness and juciness ''inhere'' in an apple, making the apple red and juicy. The ''bundle theory of substance'' explains ''compresence''. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a ''substance''. Thus, it determines ''substancehood'' empirically by the ''togetherness'' of properties rather than by a ''bare particular'' or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The ''bundle theory of substance'' thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle , Descartes , and more recently, J.P. Moreland , Quentin Smith , and others. ''Language-reality'' objection The ''language-reality'' objection to bundle theory relates to the impact language has on understanding reality. The objection maintains that language causes confusion that supports bundle theory. Per the objection, properties are synthetic constructions of language and thinking alone provides reality to the properties of any object. An apple, it claims, does not have a properties ''Red'' or ''Juicy'', but rather observers who already believe in a concept called ''Red'' use that concept to experience an apple as red. Further, the objection maintains that ''Red'' can not be distilled from an apple because ''Red'' is an abstraction from other experiences and not an innate property an apple might contain. Per the objection, it expressions such as, "An apple is red and juicy," includes at least six concepts and would best be left as dead-end logical propositions. Since the objection regards the words "Red" and "Juicy" as simply abstractions of previous experiences, it contends that they contain only a personal summary concept of one individual. Thus, the experience of an apple is as close to the ''Apple'' concept that one can get. The objection regards any additional analytic work of the mind as a synthesis of other experiences that incapable of logically revealing any true essence of ''Apple''. The ''language-reality'' objection asserts that language encourages the belief that ''synthetic exercises'' distil experiences, yet it rejects the results of such exercises by maintaining that observers actually combine experiences to create each concept of any particular property. It holds that language is a complicated belief system whose only connection to reality is an abstraction of experience. The ''language-reality'' objection may even suggest that ''reality/non-reality'' or ''objective/subjective'' distinctions themselves are merely artefacts of language and therefore are also solely abstractions of experience. BUNDLE THEORY AND EASTERN PHILOSOPHY Candrakirti , the famous Madhyamaka philosopher used the aggregate nature of objects to demonstrate the lack of Essence in what is known as the sevenfold reasoning. In his work, "Commentary on the 'Middle Way'", he says: ''A chariot is neither asserted to be other than its parts, nor to be non-other. It does not possess them. It does not depend on the parts, and the parts do not depend on it. It is neither the mere collection of the parts, nor it is their shape.'' He goes on to explain what is meant by each of these seven assertions, but briefly in a subsequent commentary he explains that the conventions of the world do not exist essentially when closely analysed, but exist only through being taken for granted, without being subject to scrutiny that searches for an essence within them. SEE ALSO REFERENCES
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