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| international relations | |
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evelated probability for inter-state conflict or conflagration due to several Countries having joined together in Alliance s or Coalition s. The agreed principles of such alliances typically include mutual-defence clauses requiring that, in the case of one member state suffering military attack from another power, all members must declare hostilities against that offending power. The result of such an arrangement is an elevated probability for an international conflagration, since the case of an actor attacking another power would almost certainly trigger--whether intentionally or not--a multinational conflict involving (potentially) infinitely more actors than the original two states which had attacked and been attacked, respectively. An additional feature aggravating the situation that exists when countries chain-gang is that no member state--at least according to sworn agreement or Treaty --has the option to refuse to participate in this involvement: once the states have agreed to the alliance, they are bound by obligation to join in the hostilities or conflagaration as soon as they have begun in one state. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES Such an environment is often believed by historians and political scientists to have existed in Europe during the period prior to World War One (''see Weltpolitik for more elaboration''). ETYMOLOGY The term is a metaphor deriving from Chain Gang s, groups of people--usually prisoners or Slave s--bound together with chains or other devices as they work or march. Like a real-life chain gang, the states joined together in a chain-gang, according to bound obligation, have no option to refuse to follow along with the intent of the others. However, in reality, the members of a chain-gang coalition can and sometimes do choose to refuse to acquiese, in which case they may face international ostracism (at least from the other members of their former alliance), and possibly courtship on the part of rival coalitions. This is because, typically, few punitive actions exists in the realm of International Law that can sufficiently compel a power to follow its obligations at all costs, and therefore, the incentives to breaking ranks cane sometimes be rather high, especially when the state does not agree with the actions taken by the other members of its coalition. SEE ALSO |
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